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INTRODUCTION
I n Regina v Parks (95 DLR 4th 27 (1992)), the 23-year- old defendant got up from his bed and, while sleepwalking, drove 14 miles to his in-laws' house. 
There he brutally stabbed and beat his mother-in-law to 
death and attempted to kill his father-in-law. Both crimes 
seemed entirely motiveless and Parks immediately turned 
himself into the police. Investigation later showed that 
Parks had a long family history of sleep disorders, as well 
as episodes of disorder documented by his prison 
cellmates and laboratory observation. Relying on experts, 
Parks successfully presented a defence of unpremeditated 
homicide and attempted homicide during a sleepwalking 
episode. He was totally acquitted of all charges.
Park's attorneys had contended that it was highly 
unlikely that Parks would be dangerous again:
(1) tiiere were no documented cases of repeated violent 
somnambulism so that the probability of recurrent 
violent somnambulism was insignificant;
(2) experts testified that Park's sleepwalking was a rare 
occurrence triggered by a combination of 
precipitating factors (sleep deprivation and high 
stress) that were unlikely to recur together; and
(3) avoidance of this stress combination, in addition to 
normal sleep hygienic measures plus drug treatment 
to consolidate sleep and reduce deep sleep, would 
likely prevent recurrence. Indeed, after the acquittal, 
Parks was put on medication and his sleepwalking 
episodes ceased.
Park's acquittal is consistent with current law, accepting 
the court's presumption that Parks was actually sleepwalking 
and therefore unconscious. The criminal law, in particular, 
presumes that most human behaviour is voluntary and that 
individuals are consciously aware of their acts. Individuals 
who act unconsciously, such as sleepwalkers, are viewed as 
not acting at all. They can be totally acquitted even if their 
behaviour resulted in a serious crime.
Some neuroscientific research suggests, however, that 
unconscious influences dominate our thoughts and 
conduct. If this is so, most human behaviour is not 
conscious or voluntary in the way that the criminal law
presumes. Rather, consciousness exists in degrees 
depending in part upon how much our awareness is 
retrievable from memory.
This schism between law and science is not new. It 
reveals a long-standing tension between two views of 
human behaviour: free will and determinism. Historically, 
the criminal law has reached a compromise. It generally 
treats conduct as autonomous and willed because that 
approach seems most feasible given the complexity and 
constraints of the criminal justice system. Yet, it also 
recognises elements of determinism by providing defences 
or mitigating circumstances.
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN LAW AND 
SCIENCE
New concerns arise over the validity of the criminal 
law's compromise between free will and determinism 
when legal doctrines increasingly conflict with moderno o J
neuroscientific research on conscious and unconscious 
processes. For example, neuroscientists complicate the 
criminal law's common-sense or 'folk psychology' notions 
of an active conscious agent exercising intentions, beliefs, 
desires, choices, voluntary conduct  free will; instead, 
they study behaviour reductionistically in terms of physical 
causes and effects explained by the function (or 
malfunction) of the brain. However, if in fact there is a 
relatively more limited basis for the folk psychology 
concepts of free will and responsibility, how do we 
interpret the concepts of criminal responsibility that are 
regularly applied by courts handling criminal cases?
My current research, briefly summarised in this essay, 
attempts to confront this clash between legal and scientific 
perspectives on consciousness by proposing ways in which 
law and science may mesh with some degree of resolution. 
I illustrate these proposals in the context of a number of 
different types of criminal law cases and doctrines 
concerning voluntary acts but excluding omissions, which 
have been discussed eloquently and in depth elsewhere. 
In line with other commentators, my research is guided by 
a fundamental premise concerning criminal responsibility: 
Until proven otherwise, common sense beliefs about 
people's behaviour, including beliefs about responsibility 
and free will, are valid and respectable.
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Consciousness and the Criminal Law's Voluntary Act 
Requirement
There are four major parts to my research. Part I 
examines the criminal law's voluntary act requirement, 
particularly in the context of Model Penal Code (MPC), s. 
2.01, which never specifically defines the term 'voluntary' 
but rather provides six examples of what that term does or 
does not include. The Model Penal Code Commentaries 
leave the work of defining voluntariness to the courts,o '
which generally have adopted the terms 'automatism' and 
'unconsciousness', respectively, to reflect the fact that the 
requirement can be applied either to the actus reus (act) or 
mens rea (mental state) elements of a crime.
Discussion includes an analysis of how the Model Penal 
Code's requirement reflects the law and psychology 
preceding and during the era in which it was developed  
the 1950s. This era was influenced in part by Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory and its early predecessors. The MPC 
in no way adopts the psychoanalytic theories or philosophies 
of Freud or his predecessors: however, it does espouse the 
commonly held belief of a theoretical dichotomy between 
conscious and unconscious thought processes. Other legal 
scholars, doctrines and statutes that influenced the Model 
Penal Code's development, particularly cases from England, 
Australia, Canada, Scotland, Ireland, and New Zealand, also 
embraced this belief.
The MPC's voluntary act provision was strikingly 
progressive and creative at the time it was introduced. 
However, it no longer reflects the MPC's goal of 
incorporating modern interdisciplinary science. Part I 
concludes by contending that there appears to be no valid 
scientific basis for a voluntary act dichotomy because 
consciousness and unconsciousness are a matter of degree, 
existing in terms of 'more or less' rather tiian 'either/or'.
How Consciousness is Defined and Researched
Part II of my research examines a range of different 
definitions of consciousness to provide a framework for 
discussing how theories and research on consciousness can 
be applied to criminal law doctrine. In general, 
consciousness is defined as a person's subjective self- 
awareness  the sum of that person's thoughts and feelings, 
circumstances and sensations. An important component of 
consciousness is that it arises from, and interlinks with, 
unconscious and conscious mental activities.
Part II also examines the development of theories of 
consciousness and why scientific interest in the topic is 
relatively recent. From about 1920 to 1960, behaviourism, 
which dominated psychology, held the view that conscious and 
unconscious processes were simply not significant subjects to 
study: behaviour could be more easily and accurately explained 
in terms of reflexes and conditioned responses. At the same 
time, Freudian psychoanalytic theory was also highly 
influential, particularly in medical schools, although it was 
criticised for lacking empirical validation. The 1970s brought
a growing disenchantment with both behaviourism and 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory, heralding an era of cognitive 
science that acknowledged the reality and significance of non- 
Freudian conscious and unconscious processes.
Part II next examines this new cognitive science. The 
research suggests that, even more than previously thought, 
our behaviour is dominated by unconscious and conscious 
influences that we may not be able to perceive consciously, 
or control. Some empirical work shows that unconscious 
processes are capable of more complex thinking than 
conscious processes, and that our unconscious can 
influence substantially our emotions and acts.
Perhaps most strikingly, there is evidence that our ability to 
have consciousness propels our belief that we act freely and 
voluntarily even though the science of consciousness suggests 
that our behaviour is determined. For example, some studies 
indicate that individuals act before they are aware that they 
are acting, even though their consciousness can eventually
o' o J
veto their further behaviour. While such research is ongoing 
and needs additional validation, it is also sophisticated and 
expanding rapidly. Moreover, despite the typical differences 
and debates among cognitive scientists, one notion becomes 
clear: There is no consensus of scientific support for the 
concept of an unconscious-conscious dichotomy.
The Confusion Between the Criminal Law's Involuntary 
Act and Insanity Defences
Part III of my research examines how the voluntary act 
requirement, interpreted by courts primarily through the 
defences of automatism and unconsciousness, conflicts 
conceptually and substantively with other key criminal law 
defences, primarily insanity. The significance of this 
discussion focuses on two realities: (1) individuals who 
successfully argue defences of automatism or 
unconsciousness can be acquitted totally, whereas (2) 
individuals who plead insanity can be committed for long 
periods of time. Individuals who are unsuccessful at either 
approach can receive a severe penalty, including the death 
penalty in the United States.
These differentials are particularly problematic because 
courts may adjudicate similar individuals differently based 
upon the courts' (oftentimes unclear) understanding of 
these defences and the science that underlies them. 
Moreover, science shows that there is an enormous 
diversity in the ways that people can be unconscious. The 
Model Penal Code Commentaries recognised the potential 
for this kind of confusion in their discussion of the 
voluntary act requirement; it appears that their prediction 
has been realised.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE 
PREDICAMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
VOLUNTARINESS
Part IV of my research considers possible solutions to 
this predicament. Suggestions range from the total 29
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abolition of an explicit statement of the voluntary act 
requirement to an act-requirement based on degrees of 
consciousness, rather than a dichotomy. I propose a three- 
tiered compromise between these two extremes.
A Three-Tiered Approach
The voluntary act requirement should be retained 
because it is bedrock of the criminal law. However, the 
requirement should be substantially simplified in its 
language and constitute three tiers:
(1) volun tary acts,
(2) involuntary acts,
(3) semi-voluntary acts.
The third category of semi-voluntary acts would 
incorporate cases that have previously been included in the 
first two categories. This approach presumes that knowledge 
about the unconscious prompts a view of individuals as being 
both more and less culpable than we used to think.
This three-tiered approach to voluntariness would rely 
on consciousness research as well as a layperson's 
assessment of how that research should be interpreted in 
the context of our current norms and values. Philosophies 
of punishment and sentencing structures should vary 
according to the extent of an individual's intentions, their 
conscious awareness of their behaviour, and social mores.
My research then illustrates the three-part approach with 
some selected cases. The analysis focuses on individuals 
who may be at risk of repeating their semi-voluntary (but 
dangerous) behaviour, the category that has created the 
most concern for courts. The Part suggests that some 
individuals who have a history of engaging in one or moreJ o o o
semi-voluntary criminal acts  or who have a background 
indicating the potential for such acts   be considered 
'conscious' or 'aware' of their propensity and therefore 
assume the responsibility to avoid such acts in the future. 
This recommendation reflects the current state of the law 
that holds individuals to be negligent or reckless if they are 
aware of the propensity to act involuntarily (for example, in 
the case of voluntary intoxication).
Lastly, there is some consideration of how the three-part 
approach would fit more readily with the currently 
existing mens rea requirements that emphasize different 
states of 'awareness.' Indeed, consciousness research 
could help fine-tune our current standards of culpability.
How the Three-tiered Approach Would Apply to a 
Criminal Case
One way to illustrate the three-tiered approach is by 
returning to the defendant in Regina v Parks, the 
sleepwalking case discussed in this essay's introduction. 
Parks was acquitted and had a number of convincing
1 O
mitigating factors in his favour. At the same time, 
however, the case scenario is troubling.7 o
Using some of the 10 criteria (a-j) listed in a New York 
interest of justice statute as a guide (see N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law, 
McKinney (2001), § 210.40(1) (a-j)), the facts point to 
potential problems: (a) Park's crimes were extremely 
serious (murder and attempted murder) as were the 
circumstances surrounding them (the brutality of the 
stabbing and beating); accordingly, (b) the extent of harm 
caused was very grave. While (d) Park's character seemed 
strongly in his favour because of lack of motive (he 
apparently got along well with his in-laws), his sleepwalking 
condition was problematic; Parks had a family history of 
sleepwalking and documented sleep disorders of his own. 
Moreover, Parks had recently lost his job because he had 
stolen $30,000 from his employer   a crime for which he 
was prosecuted. Parks said he needed the money because 
of losses incurred while betting on horses.
o
Aggregate statistics on sleepwalkers, as well as expert 
testimony, would suggest that Park's dismissal would not be 
a threat to the safety or welfare of the community (h); at the 
same time, however, it seems that the expert testimony was 
based on the presumption that Parks would be taking 
medication and following a more stress-free life. The public 
may not feel confident in the criminal justice system (g) 
knowing that Parks was free and unsupervised. According to 
one of the concurring and dissenting justices in the case, the 
trial court should make an order to keep the peace by 
imposing on Parks certain conditions (e.g. specific 
treatment) consistent with the trial court's preventive 
powers. At the same time, if Parks was truly sleepwalking 
and unconscious, there is (c) no evidence of guilt because he 
has no mens rea and (f) there would be no purpose and effect 
of imposing a sentence on him. Presumably, deterrence 
would be either limited or ineffective, and retribution 
unjust under the circumstances.
This kind of balancing test suggests that a complete
o oo I
acquittal for Parks would not be warranted. Park's history 
of sleep and financial disorders is a double-edged sword; 
the evidence appears exculpatory for this particular 
offence but inculpatory considering the potential for 
future dangerousness. Moreover, under this essay's three- 
part requirement, Park's behaviour could be considered 
semi-voluntary if unconsciousness were defined more 
narrowly and the legitimacy of Park's alleged cordial 
relations with his in-laws scrutinised more carefully. On a 
conscious level it seemed that Parks was appreciative of the 
support and affection his in-laws showed him; however, 
there may have been some latent hostility toward them as 
well because they had become involved in helping him sort 
out his financial affairs. His culpability would depend on 
how aware he was of this hostility and the possible 
consequences of it (violence toward others).
If Park's behaviour were classified as semi-voluntary, the 
court would consider the dangerousness and complexity of 
Park's acts, as well as probe more deeply the presumption 
that no motive for his acts existed. While a court could
Amicus Curiae Issue 39 January/February 2002
decide that Park's case should be dismissed under an 
interest of justice statute, there would be no determination 
on its merits. As a semi-voluntary defendant, such a 
dismissal would constitute his one bite of the apple.
If Parks ceased his treatment regimen and/or committed 
another crime (depending on whatever agreement was 
made as a condition for his dismissal) the court could 
grant the prosecution's application to resubmit Park's 
original indictment to a grand jury. This procedure 
contrasts sharply with the complete acquittal Parks would 
normally receive if he were found to have acted 
unconsciously (the actual outcome of Parks), or, at the 
other extreme, his potential candidacy for life 
imprisonment. In the United States, Parks would be 
eligible for the death penalty if he were found to have 
acted consciously and in a premeditated manner.
CONCLUSION
There are all sorts of line-drawing dilemmas throughouto o
the criminal law. However, my research indicates that the 
problems with the voluntary act requirement are 
particularly acute:
(1) The requirement is the initial filter (at least 
conceptually) for all individuals potentially eligible for 
the criminal justice system. It therefore assesses 
actors with the widest possible range of mental states, 
behaviours and potential defences, because the system 
has yet to determine if they should proceed or be 
acquitted entirely. A forced "voluntary/involuntary" 
dichotomy amidst such heterogeneity can produce 
particularly artificial choices with potentially extreme 
variations in sanctions for similar types of behaviours 
depending on how they are categorised (e.g. 
involuntary, insane, voluntary and dangerous).
(2) Other criminal law doctrines (such as culpability) have 
a relatively broader line-drawing selection (for 
example, the four mental states under the Model Penal 
Code) within a more homogenous group of individuals 
(persons who have already been determined to commit
only voluntary acts). Therefore, the line-drawing 
choices and their consequences are far less extreme 
than those faced by voluntariness determinations.
(3) Voluntariness determinations rely relatively more on 
factual medical/psychological information than do other 
dichotomous conceptions (such as reasonableness 
versus unreasonableness), which depend on jurors' 
views of appropriate social and moral norms of 
behaviour. The criminal justice system presumes that 
jurors know what kind of behaviour is unreasonable 
based on their own kinds of life experiences. Insanity 
determinations also have a strong normative 
component, even though expert testimony and legal 
standards provide guidance. Yet, involuntariness 
doctrines or jury instructions commonly offer specific 
examples of what that term means (for example, 
unconsciousness due to sleepwalking) because jurors 
typically are not going to know otherwise (insanity 
provisions do not contain such specific examples). In 
this sense, the science of involuntariness (and 
unconsciousness) is particularly critical.
My research concludes that the criminal law, as it 
currently exists, is sufficiently robust to incorporate new 
research on consciousness without being dismantled 
philosophically. Consciousness research does not threaten 
the criminal law's free will foundation any more than 
traditionally accepted science and doctrines. Rather, the 
research enlightens our normatively held beliefs and 
values. Potential claims to the contrary predict, 
prematurely, a type of deterministic society and individual 
that may exist only in novels. Time will tell, but that time 
has not yet arrived. ©
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Note: This essay summarizes a larger, forthcoming, article entitled 
'Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts'. For 
reprints of this article, please contact Deborah Denno, Fordham 
University School of Law, 140 West 62nd Street, New York, New 
York 10023, USA.
Powers and process in revenue law
C Stefanou and H Xanthaki, A Legal and Political Interpretation of 
Article 215(2) [new Article 288(2)] of the Treaty of Rome: The individual 
strikes back, Ashgate Dartmouth 2000, ix + 236 pp, £ 39.95.
This monograph is an interesting piece of the puzzle depicting the relationship between the individual and the state (national and European). The authors 
have drawn relevance from different disciplines (law, 
political science, international relations) and constructed 
some basic assumptions to support their thesis. Stefanou 
and Xanthaki's pivotal point is a detailed analysis and a
splendid case-law codification of the non-contractual 
liability regime ante and post Francovich, which builds their 
argument that Article 215(2) EC could be utilised as the 
procedural basis for joint liability of EU institutions and 
member states (and their authorities) for failure to 
implement Community law.
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